ページ1:

Regionalism
Cade
PTA
Trade Diverting
INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC
AND
mecial factor mochel
TRADE ISSUES
CHINA
East
103-1
China's
One Road
Rotterdam
dend are

ページ2:

Interest aggregation lobbyn costs
Regionalism PTAS
-
Trade creating
Price
NTT
Gatica moss
-Trade Diverting
Price
W+T
BIT
Denonel.
Trade.
BT
W
-
PTA →
Security Externalities
→ Competition
soft-balancing.
CHINA & East Asia.
B
Pe Prent
Trade
• Special factor model.
import-competing sectors are
protected from B
17
Special interest groups.
China's marshall plan: "One Belt, One Road"
Moscow candian, HO
Rotterdam
Silk Road
Istanbul
Economic Belt
India p
Maritime
Africa 2
Colleen Silk Road
Special Interest. < Pressure / Interest Groups.
-
K
product prices
(consumer loss).
HO Model + Stoper- Samuelson
Abun dant
Theorem
V9.
Scarce
V
-
Ricardo-Viner
(Specific-Sector Model)
Export sector
:
VS.
Import-competing
sector.

ページ3:

-
Education freetrade.
Socio-Economic Status
- Sociotropic Concerns
Government Policies
(TNCs).
Transnational Corporations
Int'l Financial System
Embedded Liberalism.
Multilateralism
TNCS Race to the bottom"
Labor standards / Environment.
"Lobbying problem"
CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility).
Milton Friedman.
Impossible Trinity
Control
exchange
rate
(China)
Financial Controls
draining foreign reserves
(buy its own currency)
fixed exchange
Tate
(Hong Kong)
A Co
D
Control
O
(US)
Free
Interest Floating Exchange rate financial
Vulnerability
Flows
Pelative Par hurting export-oriented countries, 1
3.
export-oriented, denmand high
exchange rate high
↓
ghurt export-ortente
industries

ページ4:

2
Interest aggregation lobbying costs
policy-making process
critical mass
e.g. Export Subsidy (Country W).
Price
Ps
Subsidy PW
consumer loss.
Deadweight lass
Negative!!
export more
price in W↑
export more
price in Sv.
Trade Policymaking Process
producer gain.
Terms of Trade loss.
govat subsidy
→ Quantity:
Ricardian. HO, RV models.
Economic Forces.
I
Profit-Maximizers
Political Distortions
Security externalities
State/Government < international system.
Special Interest Groups < Losers of free trade ✓
Individuals/Consumers
collective action problem V
sociotropic politics
Access points. veto players.
Individual Trade Policy Preferences.
- HO Model
Class Factor
Human capital high or low skills.
Richardo-Viner
Occupations
Export or
Import-Competing

ページ5:

Military Conflicts.
→Liberal Peace. Sistem
O Sensitivity Interdependence.
China
inflation
Demand T Price export TP Supply PT
Represente tut
Vulnerability Interdependence. Country
"Costly" to rupture or forego relationship.
protect
Opportunity Cost Perspective.
Opportunity cost of war
90
londi
4
trade military conquest (substitutes)
(also invasion)
Communication Perspective Repeated Game
infectionics
Domestic Politics Perspective.
e.g. Democratic Peace Theory
Counterarguments.
Asymmetry
Irrelevance e.g. WWI (Europe)
Vulnerability.
*Relative Pow or
.
Bargaining Theory.
terms of trade + military conflicts
= bargaining power.
trade conflict: non-linear.
• X full-fledged war o low- ace

ページ6:

5.
Political Institutions.
Parliamentary System
(responsible.
to parliament)
Presidential System
pro-trade
(responsible to pp!).
-
Majoritarianism
protectionist.
-
Proportional Representation → (facing the whole
country, can't protect
minority)
2 Autocracies.
tA
[Democracy
Protectionist ta
Autocracies
D
Moderate
C
tA
closer